Christian Tomuschat Discusses Human Rights Abuses in Guatemala.

Show: FRESH AIR
Date: MARCH 04, 1999
Time: 12:00
Tran: 030401np.217
Type: FEATURE
Head: Christian Tomuschat
Sect: News; International
Time: 12:06

TERRY GROSS, HOST: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

From Latin America to Africa, countries are trying to figure out how to deal with former government and military leaders who were responsible for torture and other acts against -- other violent acts -- against the civilian population.

The Guatemala Truth Commission has just issued a report on human rights violations during Guatemala's 36 year civil war which ended in 1996. The commission, sponsored by the UN, estimates the conflict resulted in 200,000 deaths and disappearances. The commission holds the Guatemalan military responsible for 93 percent of the deaths and the leftist guerrillas for 3 percent.

The report also said the United States provided direct and indirect support for some state operations. But the report's most stunning conclusion was that the military committed acts of genocide against the Mayan people during the most brutal part of the armed conflict in the early '80s.

The Mayans are the indigenous population who are mostly poor. The civil war was in some ways a classic Cold War dispute, a right-wing dictatorship representing the elite challenged by a guerrilla movement receiving some communist support. The U.S. backed the dictatorship in an attempt to prevent the spread of communism.

Christian Tomuschat is the head of the truth commission, which is officially called the Historical Clarification Commission. We called him at his office in Berlin. I asked how the commission reached its conclusion about state sponsored genocide in the early '80s.

CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW PROFESSOR; HEAD OF HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION COMMISSION ON GUATEMALA: Well, we came to the conclusion that in four regions of the country, which we subjected to specific investigation, genocide was committed by agents of the state. So it was not an overall and comprehensive finding for all the period of the armed confrontation.

Now our conclusion is based mainly on the fact that in some communities everyone was killed: men, women, children and babies. Not a single person was left living, and so this atrocious killing -- this massive killing -- of a defenseless population cannot be explained otherwise than by an intention really to exterminate the group as such.

Because nowhere have babies been warriors which took the arms and fought against the government troops. So there must have been a strategy to annihilate and to exterminate the population as such. And that is really the main basis of our finding.

They were some -- there are some other supporting elements which also were relied upon to support this finding. But this comprehensive nature of the killing that took place, that was the main pillar of what we found.

GROSS: In these acts of genocide, did you find that there was racism against the Mayan people that went beyond politics?

TOMUSCHAT: Yes, it could really only be explained by racism. Because in no case did we find that such massive killing took place to the detriment of the Latino population. There had been some massacres committed also against the Latino population in earlier years, but nowhere was the killing so complete -- so absolute -- as in these Mayan communities which were submitted to a policy of scorched earth from '81 to '83.

GROSS: Now were the leftist rebels guilty of atrocities themselves?

TOMUSCHAT: Yes, we found that the guerrilla also committed acts of killing and also some massacres. But it was not genocide because we couldn't find -- well, there was an intention to kill members of the group as such. It was also -- these were also acts of intimidation. There was pressure which was brought to bear on the population.

But it was not the same intention. The guerrilla sought military and political advantages by killing people, but it certainly was not their intention to kill the group as such.

GROSS: And I believe that the statistics you came up with was 93 percent of the killing was attributed to the army, three percent to the leftist rebels.

TOMUSCHAT: Yes, on the basis of the testimonies and other materials which we received the figure -- the overall figure might be a little bit different if you had a complete breakdown of all the killings. But the commission just had to work on the basis of what it received as evidence.

And our main evidence was really the testimony from the witnesses, nothing else. Little else -- very few documents which we requested the government and the armed forces to provide, but the response was very limited and we received limited documentary evidence from the government.

GROSS: There's been increasing awareness of rape as a war crime. I'm wondering what you found in your investigations of how rape was used in attacks against women.

TOMUSCHAT: It was used, unfortunately, in a systematic manner, and all the women -- or most of the women -- before they were killed were violated. This was almost a compulsory stage before the killing. The soldiers looked at women as just objects which could be looted.

The brutality was really unspeakable -- undescribable. Sometimes the bellies of the women were opened. Babies were extracted from pregnant women. It was a terrible time, and it's hard to understand why all this happened -- how this could happen. How human beings could be converted into beasts because they acted, in those instances really, as beasts and not as human beings.

GROSS: The truth commission report found that forced disappearance was a systematic practice of the military. What did you learn about how that worked?

TOMUSCHAT: Well, we found that there was a systematic pattern of disappearances from the earliest period of the armed confrontation onwards. From 1966 that was a practice -- massive forced disappearance was really invented in Guatemala and used as a device for forging political purposes for combating, as it were, communism because there was a strong ideology of anti-communism. This continued over the time until the latest period of the armed confrontation.

GROSS: What's the logic behind disappearances?

TOMUSCHAT: Well, the logic behind disappearances is first to make political opponents -- to disappear them, first of all. Then not to leave any traces in some instances. Just the person -- well, from one day to the next he cannot be found anymore. No traces left.

And of course one of the main objectives of disappearances is to terrorize a population, because there is such a state of insecurity that everyone who risks to say critical words must face up to their danger and everyone is, or was, aware that the same could happen to him -- the same fate.

And this was really used in particular as an instrument to -- really to put pressure, and more than pressure, to act by terroristic acts in order not to permit any kind of criticism of governmental policies.

GROSS: My guest is Christian Tomuschat, the head of the Guatemala Truth Commission. We'll talk more after a break.

This is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: My guest is Christian Tomuschat, the head of the UN sponsored Guatemala Truth Commission which just released its report on Guatemala's 36 year civil war.

Does your report recommend that the individuals who were most responsible for the massacres, the genocide, the torture be prosecuted in the court of law?

TOMUSCHAT: Well, we are saying in our recommendations that Guatemala should abide by its own law of national reconciliation, a law which says that there is an amnesty -- which decrees an amnesty. But it limits that amnesty very carefully.

First of all, acts for which amnesty is granted must be narrowly tied up to armed conflict. And second, there are some crimes for which amnesty is not granted, in particular it is the crime of genocide. There is, according to the Guatemalan legislation, no general partner nor amnesty nor anything else for genocide. So according to the Guatemala legislation these acts must be prosecuted.

GROSS: Now I know that your commission is also recommending that there be investigations into what happened to the disappeared people.

TOMUSCHAT: Yes, right.

GROSS: That there be a policy of exhumation -- that the remains of victims of armed confrontation found in hidden cemeteries would be handed over to relatives for a dignified burial.

TOMUSCHAT: Mmm-hmm.

GROSS: Do you expect that there will be follow-up on that? That there will be investigations into the disappeared. That there will be investigations to find hidden cemeteries so that the remains...

TOMUSCHAT: ...oh, I have no doubt that everything -- as far as hidden cemeteries are concerned the government will indeed implement our recommendations. Because it is known that these cemeteries exist and the family members insist that a decent burial be given to their beloved ones.

Now as far as other recommendations are concerned, it may be more doubtful. But as far as hidden cemeteries are concerned I have no doubts whatsoever.

GROSS: Now I know some of your report is based on oral histories. Was it difficult to get people to talk with you about atrocities that they had witnessed or that they knew of?

TOMUSCHAT: Oh yes, it was sometimes very difficult. First of all, people -- many people -- are still afraid. They thought that making declarations would expose them to reprisals on the part of those who in the past held power.

GROSS: Could you give them reassurances that that wasn't going to happen?

TOMUSCHAT: Well, to the extent possible. Because, well, we had no police force, we ourselves -- we needed some security support. So we were not able. But we could tell people that if all of them -- if a whole community speaks out then nobody can threaten them anymore.

And many communities recognized this opportunity to get rid of the traumas of the past by making declarations, and at the same time, you know, making threats a blunt -- a useless weapon. Because once the truce is known what can you do as a formal offer? It's useless to threaten those who have given their testimony.

GROSS: Well, I guess the value of it would be preventing other people from giving their testimony, creating a climate of fear that would suppress the truth.

TOMUSCHAT: Well, in many parts of the country, in particular in the most seriously affected parts of the country people really massively came to the offices of our commission. In some other parts of the country people were more cautious and didn't like to speak out.

And we had one case where people who had made their declarations afterwards requested us that they could restore their declarations, because they indeed feared that this might lead to some reprisals or other hostile acts against them. And indeed we complied with their request.

GROSS: Were you there to actually hear firsthand the testimony of witnesses?

TOMUSCHAT: Yes. Many times we commissioners -- we ourselves went out into the countryside to assist our investigators when declarations were made. We traveled to all of the regional offices to be present there and to see ourselves how the work progressed. And which difficulties our investigators were facing up to.

In particular, there was a difficulty with the Mayan languages because many people in Guatemala simply don't speak Spanish. So we needed translators. And in particular those people who don't speak Spanish are not used to telling stories straightforward. They move a little bit around in circles. You have to win their confidence, and then it goes on maybe for hours until you learn everything about the whole story which they wish to tell you.

GROSS: I'm wondering what impact it had on you personally as the head of the commission to hear so many stories of torture and murder.

TOMUSCHAT: Well, you know, it's shocking and it leaves you really moved -- deeply moved. And even if you just read some parts of our report -- we inserted quite a number of testimonies -- the true testimony as it was given by the witnesses.

Then you find that these were terrible terrible times. And what personally affected me most was these reports about mistreatment and other attacks against -- sexual assault on women. Maybe this is the most frightening part of our report.

GROSS: Did you say most frightening part of the report?

TOMUSCHAT: It is frightening because it shows you how debased human nature can become. That it can lose all principle of morality. That there is nothing left. That they just act as killing machines and this really is frightening.

We, particularly in Germany, believe that after the terror of the Second World War this would not happen again, but again there was a doctrine of brutality which was officially taught at military academies in Guatemala. In any event, soldiers were taught to behave like beasts. And this was practiced for several years.

And nobody really was interested in that. Journalists didn't wake-up. And as I said, the U.S. government was well aware of what happened but it didn't make any representations to the government of Guatemala as far as we know.

GROSS: Now you mentioned before that you had to have security while you were in Guatemala. Were there any attempted attacks on members of the commission? Did members of the Guatemalan military or government try to intimidate you in any way?

TOMUSCHAT: No. Fortunately, I can say that, very frankly and openly, at no time did the Guatemalan government try to intimidate us -- to threaten us. There were difficulties with the Guatemala government, some political tensions from time to time. They charged us with exceeding our mandate.

But there was really no intent to obstruct our work -- to impede our work. And we received no threats, although this is really a rare occurrence because death threats by telephone are something which is almost normal in Guatemala.

But this did not happen, and for that reason we're really very grateful to the government of Guatemala to have permitted our investigation to proceed smoothly and without any kind of that intimidation or other obstacles.

GROSS: You presented your truth commission report to the people of Guatemala last week. What reaction did you get in Guatemala?

TOMUSCHAT: Well, I think in the press 98 percent of the voices were very positive. They welcomed the report and most people said, well, all of this was already known. But to say it officially, in the presence of the head of state and of the minister of defense and of high-ranking ambassadors and ministers and also in the presence of the people, makes it different.

And that now really Guatemala is under an obligation to look into its past. There were only very few dissenting voices from the right hand side of the political spectrum. And I find it very positive that the government did not immediately react. That the government decided to wait to read the report carefully and then only to come up with an official statement.

GROSS: You presented your report to members of the United Nations on Monday. What reaction are you getting to that presentation?

TOMUSCHAT: Well again, the response was very positive. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, showed great interest and he felt that this was an important contribution to the peace process in Guatemala.

Again, the diplomatic community, in particular the representatives of donor countries who had financed the truth commission, was very positive in its statements. So I think the overall response is extremely positive.

GROSS: Christian Tomuschat, thank you very much for discussing the truth commission report with us.

TOMUSCHAT: OK. Good. Thank you.

GROSS: Christian Tomuschat is the head of the Guatemala Truth Commission. He spoke to us from his office in Berlin.

I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.

This is a rush transcript. This copy may not
be in its final form and may be updated.

TO PURCHASE AN AUDIOTAPE OF THIS PIECE, PLEASE CALL 877-21FRESH
Dateline: Terry Gross, Washington, DC
Guest: Christian Tomuschat
High: Professor of international law Christian Tomuschat headed the Historical Clarification Commission on Guatemala, a United Nations supported truth commission on human rights abuses in Guatemala during that country's 36 year civil war. A peace treaty was signed in Guatemala in 1996. The report was issued last month. It finds that the U.S. agencies knew far more about atrocities committed by the Guatemalan Army and its death squads than the United States acknowledged. It also finds that Guatemalan government forces were responsible for 93 percent of the 200,000 Guatemalans killed during the war.
Spec: Latin America; Death Foreign Aid; Human Rights; United Nations; Military; Murders; Rape; Violence; War; World Affairs; Christian Tomuschat

Please note, this is not the final feed of record
Copy: Content and programming copyright 1999 WHYY, Inc. All rights reserved. Transcribed by FDCH, Inc. under license from WHYY, Inc. Formatting copyright 1999 FDCH, Inc. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to WHYY, Inc. This transcript may not be reproduced in whole or in part without prior written permission.
End-Story: Christian Tomuschat

Show: FRESH AIR
Date: MARCH 04, 1999
Time: 12:00
Tran: 030402NP.217
Type: FEATURE
Head: Kate Doyle
Sect: News; International
Time: 12:30

TERRY GROSS, HOST: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

We're discussing the findings of the Guatemala Truth Commission on atrocities committed during the 36 year Guatemalan civil war. The commission found that the government was responsible for 93 percent of the deaths and disappearances during the war. It also said that the government committed acts of genocide against the indigenous Mayan population.

Important evidence came from formerly secret U.S. documents about the war. My guest Kate Doyle lead the effort to get those U.S. documents declassified. She directs the Guatemala Project of the National Security Archive in Washington D.C. I asked her to read from a formally classified document, a 1994 cable from a U.S. defense attache in Guatemala to the Defense Intelligence Agency headquarters in Washington D.C.

KATE DOYLE, ANALYST, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: "During this period, that is the 1980s, the Director of Intelligence ran and coordinated all operations. The southern base itself has been used both as an operations center and an interrogation center by the D2.

Small buildings on the base that had been since destroyed were used as holding cells and interrogation rooms for the insurgents. There were pits dug on the perimeter of the base, now filled with concrete, that were once filled with water and used to hold prisoners. Reportedly, there were cages over the pits and the water level was such that the individuals held within them were forced to hold onto the bars in order to keep their heads above water to avoid drowning.

One technique used to removed insurgents that had been killed during interrogation, and times that were still alive but needed to disappear, was to throw them out of aircraft over the ocean. A rava (ph), is a certain kind of airplane, were normally parked at the south end of the runway after midnight.

D2 personnel would drive bound prisoners and bodies out to the waiting aircraft and load them aboard. The pilots were instructed to fly 30 minutes off the coast of Guatemala and then push the prisoners and bodies out of the aircraft.

In this way, the D2 has been able to remove the majority of the evidence showing that the prisoners had been tortured and killed."

GROSS: What does this document tell you about what the United States knew of Guatemala and how does that connect to the United States' support of Guatemala?

DOYLE: This document, which was produced in 1994 but concerned activities of the 1980s, is just one record among thousands of records that the National Security Archive now has that provide unequivocal and clear evidence of the U.S. knowledge of the Guatemalan military's role in the atrocities in that country -- during the 1980s, during the 1990s and before that.

And I think what is most disturbing to those of us in this country who are only just beginning to understand the dimensions of our knowledge about the violence, is that the United States continued to overtly and publicly support the Guatemalan government, fund the Guatemalan military, train the military through our international military training programs.

During these same periods in which our advisers and our embassy personnel and our defense attaches were sending secret cables up to Washington describing in the most intimate terms the kinds of violence and atrocities that the military was committing.

GROSS: From the American documents that you are able to get declassified could you tell whether the United States actually funded massacres and funded torture, or were they just more generally funding the government which in turn backed massacre and torture?

In other words, how direct was the U.S. involvement?

DOYLE: It really depends on the period that you're talking about. If you look at the documents declassified about the 1960s, and we do have now some really extraordinary material -- secret and top secret cables. Not simply from the embassy and the DoD, but from the CIA as well.

It becomes clear that the CIA and the AID -- the Agency for International Development, which had a police program in Guatemala in the 1960s -- were not simply supporting through indirect aid or training, but were actually helping to establish counter insurgency and military intelligence units. And design a strategy of raids and arrests and interrogation that did directly lead to some of the first forced disappearances in that country.

In fact the very first and most famous case, which was the disappearance of some 30 communist leaders their associates and friends, took place in 1966 by a unit that was established and trained for that purpose by the United States government.

So if you look back to the early years of the war, I think there was a fairly direct involvement on the part of the United States officials in the operations that the Guatemalan military carried out. During the period of the worst massacres, on the other hand, I think that what the issue was that we had -- for decades by that point -- helped train these units and get them up and running who were now carrying out these massacres.

But no, there is no evidence in the documents that agents at the CIA or officials of the United States government were sitting down at a table and ordering this or that massacre.

GROSS: Now as part of your work you've also designed a military database. This is a database with information on the Guatemalan Armed Forces drawn from the declassified documents. What's the purpose of this military database?

DOYLE: One of the issues that the Guatemalan population is only just beginning to come to terms with now is their lack of access to information about their own government. And specifically in this case, the Guatemalan Armed Forces. If Guatemala is going to institute permanent civilian control of the military, one of the things that the Guatemalan civilians are going to need is basic information about what their military looks like and who runs it.

The documents are unequivocal about the fact that the military in Guatemala is a strictly hierarchical structure, and that violence and atrocities were not committed by loose cannon individuals or right -- members of the right that weren't under the control of the Guatemalan Armed Forces.

But rather that the commanding officers -- the senior level of the Guatemalan military -- not simply knew what was happening, but ordered what happened. And because of that we felt that any information we could give the Guatemalan people -- the human rights organizations, the commission, military scholars and so forth -- about the basic structures, specifically the command structure of the Guatemalan military: who these individuals senior officers are; where they were posted during the conflict; what they were doing and what they were commanding.

Would help put tools in the hands of the Guatemalans to then analyze what was the role of these individual units and senior officers.

GROSS: How did you persuade the U.S. government to declassify secret documents about Guatemala?

DOYLE: The collection the National Security Archive is actually made up of a number of different collections of materials. And some of them we got through the Freedom of Information Act, which marvelously is a law that we have in this country that provides citizens the right to gain access to information produced by their own government.

But there are a number of other materials that came out that were declassified by the government in the course of these last few years, and I guess the most significant collection would be that which the U.S. government provided the commission in response to the Clarification Commission's own request of the U.S. that it support the commission's work.

When the commission was beginning its investigation in 1997, it submitted a formal petition to President Clinton asking for support in the form of documentation. And lo and behold, after five or six months, the Clinton administration decided to release this material.

I think their decision to do so came out of a number of factors, but one factor is that there was an immense amount of public pressure from human rights organizations in this country and internationally on the Clinton administration to get them to open their secret archives for these investigations into the past.

GROSS: My guest is Kate Doyle of the National Security Archive. We'll talk more after a break.

This is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: Back with Kate Doyle of the National Security Archives. She led the effort to declassify secret U.S. documents about Guatemala.

What do you think are the most important findings of the Guatemala Truth Commission?

DOYLE: There are a number of extraordinary and important findings that the Clarification Commission made in its report. I think one of the first that I should mention, and by the way this was a finding that during the presentation of the report elicited both cheers and sobs and a standing ovation of some five minutes long. It was really an extraordinary moment.

Was when the Clarification Commission, that is when Christian Tomuschat announced that the commission had found the military guilty of acts of genocide. That was an extremely important earth shattering moment for everyone listening and for Guatemala society in general.

Because the army has been able to maintain a kind of false legitimacy through this, let's call it, "plausible deniability" about its role in the violence for so long; that although Guatemalan society knows perfectly well, and knew long before the Clarification Commission ever came along, the role of the military and the violence.

To hear an official with the weight of a Christian Tomuschat, the weight of the United Nations, the weight of a peace accord stand on the stage and announce in absolutely clear ringing tones that the military was responsible for genocide was a profoundly moving and extraordinary moment.

GROSS: What are some of the choices facing the Guatemala people now? For instance, they could decide to give amnesty to the people who are guilty or to try to even further investigate the names of the people who are guilty. Or they could choose to prosecute people who are responsible for torture and genocide.

DOYLE: The most important step for Guatemalans today, I think, is to turn now to the judicial system. Historically, the justice system in that country has been very weak; often collaborating with the powers that be, including the military, not to prosecute responsible individuals.

And I think one of the main challenges for Guatemalan society today is to reform that justice system and follow through with some of the basic criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of these atrocities. One of the most important cases before the Guatemalan courts today is the case of the assassination of Bishop Juan Jose Girardi (ph).

Who was killed a year ago, almost exactly, after having presented the Catholic Church's own human rights report which also identified the military as the key perpetrator of the violence. Forty-eight hours after Bishop Girardi present that report he was bludgeoned to death by unknown men who still have not been caught. And this case is making its slow and tortured way through the Guatemalan system.

Those kinds of cases now need to be addressed, and yes, perpetrators need to be identified and prosecuted.

GROSS: I'm wondering if were following the story in Guatemala in the early 1980s at the height of the massacres and the torture. And if so, did you think that the documents revealing the truth about the massacre and torture would ever be released?

DOYLE: Yes. Like many of us in this country, I was following the violence. And no, I guess I can say that I never believed the United States would actually put these documents out into the public realm. And for that reason I have to give some credit to the United States government for releasing this material.

You know, the Clarification Commission actually formally requested documents not only from the United States, but from Argentina, Israel and Taiwan among other governments who had been involved in the country through aid and assistance programs to the Guatemala military in the course of the civil conflict.

The United States was the only country to respond. And as a result, if you look at the Clarification Report, the only country that is cited in any detailed way for its role in supporting this murderous force is the United States. So I think one has to, at a minimum, give a tip of the hat to the U.S. -- to the Clinton administration for making the somewhat difficult decision to release documents that contain incriminating evidence about itself and its own role.

GROSS: Well, I want to thank you very much for talking with us.

DOYLE: You're welcome, Terry.

GROSS: Kate Doyle directs the Guatemala Project of the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.

This is a rush transcript. This copy may not
be in its final form and may be updated.

TO PURCHASE AN AUDIOTAPE OF THIS PIECE, PLEASE CALL 877-21FRESH
Dateline: Terry Gross, Washington, DC
Guest: Kate Doyle
High: Analyst for the National Security Archives, Kate Doyle. She directed the Guatemalan Documentation Project which lead to the declassification of documents from the CIA and the State and Defense Departments on Guatemala. These documents were handed over to the commission and filled the gap left by the Guatemalan military, which claimed its files had been lost.
Spec: Latin America; Death; War; World Affairs; Death; Violence; Murders; Military; Foreign Aid; Kate Doyle

Please note, this is not the final feed of record
Copy: Content and programming copyright 1999 WHYY, Inc. All rights reserved. Transcribed by FDCH, Inc. under license from WHYY, Inc. Formatting copyright 1999 FDCH, Inc. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to WHYY, Inc. This transcript may not be reproduced in whole or in part without prior written permission.
End-Story: Kate Doyle

Show: FRESH AIR
Date: MARCH 04, 1999
Time: 12:00
Tran: 030403NP.217
Type: FEATURE
Head: Jennifer Schirmer
Sect: News; International
Time: 12:45

GROSS: Earlier on the show the head of the Guatemala Truth Commission told us that the finding that affected him most was the military sexual assaults against women. My guest Jennifer Schirmer has interviewed members of the Guatemala military who committed rape and torture.

She teaches at Harvard and is the author of "The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy," which is based on those interviews. I asked her to read an excerpt of her interview with a military man who raped and tortured civilians.

JENNIFER SCHIRMER, POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGIST; AUTHOR, "THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY PROJECT: A VIOLENCE CALLED DEMOCRACY": This is a young man who, basically at 16, was asked to become a G2 which is an Army intelligence investigator and torturer. And he was trained in some of the methods by being taking to one of the cells where they had people destined to be killed by the army.

And he basically -- he said they gave you a knife and throw you together to see how you react while that officer watches. And in the cell he said they give you -- you have to figure out a way to torture that person -- how to kill that person. And if you have enough courage to do that. Sort of, in many ways, a cold-blooded training.

And then he said you go on to begin to do you work and you make pieces of that person. To do it like one cuts up an animal. And if one does the job well and they think you have enough encourage to do these things then they give you a position in a patrol to go out and torture those who need to be eliminated according to the army.

In part of the interview that I had with them I asked him as a G2 participant did torturing a woman include raping her. And yes, he said this is normal. But it depends on the women too, because there are many women who aren't worth the effort to look at.

"But at times the opportunity arose to be able to kidnap a young woman, to investigate a young woman or for a young woman combatant to be wounded in combat. Well, that woman couldn't escape us. That woman, the first -- the first -- very first thing would be to rape her, right. That's the very first thing."

"By everyone on patrol?" I asked. "Yes, everyone. The chief is the first." He laughs. "And then the lieutenant. And the commander of G2. And the chief of the patrol. If I were chief of the patrol on that day then it would be my turn. This woman I like and so I would tell them leave her over here or cover me. The rapes occurred as normal procedure."

GROSS: Now what was his attitude about this when he was describing rape as normal procedure? Did he seem to have any remorse about that?

SCHIRMER: Well, actually later on he did say that the message he wanted to give to those who don't know anything about G2 is this -- and I'm quoting -- "don't allow your relatives or your sons to be converted into a killer like myself. If I could ask forgiveness from those I hurt I would do so. Including those many people I robbed. But there are wounds I cannot repair. I can't very well go to the house of the Senora and say Senora, look I assassinated your son and I've come here so you can forgive me.

This woman, if she had a gun, she'd probably shoot me. Or if she had a machete she'd kill me. So all I can ask is God's forgiveness because I can't go directly to her or anyone else and ask for it. If I could change my personality I'd leave all this. But at 31 years old I'm too old for this kind of work. And you don't see anyone over 40 in the G2.

That's why when you enter G2 they tell you to forget about your family, to forget about retiring from the job. To lead a tranquil life. They tell you -- because when you're no longer serviceable to this organization your own colleagues will be the ones who are going to kill you."

And I ask, "because you know too much?" "Of course you know too much."

GROSS: Did you find other people who echoed his thoughts and had remorse for what they'd done?

SCHIRMER: I would say a number of officers I interviewed. But I would say on the whole, no. Most of them felt that what they had done in what they refer to as the pacification campaign, which was the massacre campaigns in the early '80s was something that they honestly believed that they were doing the right thing.

That they honestly believed that in order to save the institution of the army; in order to save the state, which in their minds is one in the same thing, they had to proceed in a very very systematic manner to, if necessary, kill as they proceeded to do to a percent of the population.

So overall, my sense is that these officers have a mindset which frankly I was quite shocked about in coming to terms with this. There is no moral dilemma here in killing. The difference, I think, is that we see that there are those who feel that in order to do so you must do in a very systematic manner. And not to end up in what they refer to as blindness.

You have to know why you're doing it and you have to be systematic about doing it. And so in their minds I would say the majority of officers I spoke with there was a sense that this was justifiable and they needed to restore order. And if it meant the massive violence then so be it.

GROSS: What else did the man who was a torturer working for army intelligence tell you about the methods of torture that they used?

SCHIRMER: I'm going to read another section from the torturer. I asked him what kinds of torture methods does G2 use. "We use the most painful we can find in order to pull out as much information from a person. Sewing needles, electric cables, worn places in electric battery and water and electrifies the water. There are many forms of this -- pulling out fingernails."

Who decides which methods to use?" I asked him. "It depends on the person being tortured. There are those who only need to be pricked with a needle and say `don't kill me I'm going to help you.' So you stop with that person -- torturing that person -- and only two or three more kicks and that person remains there.

And then there are those who say, `no you so and so I'm a guerrilla I'm not going to squeal. The mission of a guerrilla is to leave and return alive or dead but never to say anything.'

And when they say no and they give you no information it's someone you then cut off at least a finger. And he says, `kill me. I will say nothing.' Then you cut off an year and he still refuses to speak. Then you cut off another finger and he still refuses. And you realize that you could cut this person into a thousand pieces and he won't give you anything. So why bother torturing ham. So in one stroke you eliminate him."

GROSS: My guest is Jennifer Schirmer. She teaches at Harvard and is the author of "The Guatemalan Military Project." We'll talk more after a break.

This is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: My guest is Harvard teacher Jennifer Schirmer, who has interviewed members of the Guatemalan military about raping and torturing victims.

The Truth Commission report talks about acts of genocide, systematic torture, state sponsored disappearances. Did you meet any of the people and interview any of the people who participated in the genocide?

SCHIRMER: Yes, I did. I interviewed a number of officers. In fact I interviewed several colonels and generals who were involved in planning and implementing the campaign massacre strategy.

And one general actually on the table where we were having the interview drew out the massacre campaign. And in the interview I had with him he says, "the Army attacked and here were the villages on this side. Here's the population supporting the guerrillas from behind. And the army attack everyone. And we continued attacking and attacking and attacking until we cornered them.

And we got to the point where the population was separated from the leaders exactly in 1982. And we did in many ways -- he says -- 180 degree turn in strategy."

And what he's referring to here is this shift in strategy from a hundred percent extermination in '80 and '81 to what he refers to as a 30-70 percent one. In which 30 percent of the effort is -- goes towards the killing zones.

And he refers to these as killing zones -- "mata zonas" (ph) -- in which every living thing is trapped within a zone is killed. And 70 percent of the of the effort in this massacre campaign is put into feeding refugees, establishing civil patrols -- in other words, creating forms in which the population itself can become participants in the killing. To create complicity within the indigenous population itself.

And this strategy is referred to as "beans and bullets." In which elimination is directly connected with recuperation of refugees from these massacres to, in many ways, ensure a permanent presence of the military in these areas.

GROSS: So if I understand this correctly, this means that the Mayan peasants who, before had been the victims of genocide, were now offered a deal. If you don't want to be killed then work for the military and we'll feed you.

SCHIRMER: Yes, essentially that. And what -- when you talk about these issues with these officers they refer to the issue of that no distinction was made between civilian populations and the guerrilla. When in fact they were attacking and massacring these villages.

And then what they would do is they would often capture people and force them to become either informers or soldiers or civil patrollers to work with the Army. In other words, they made the civilian population -- the indigenous population -- they made them make a choice: either you die or you collaborate.

GROSS: What surprised you most about the truth commission's findings?

SCHIRMER: I think that the most surprising finding is that the truth commission began with a very -- from a very weak mandate. Really, one of the weakest of all truth commissions in the hemisphere. It was not allowed to name names. It's documentation was not to be utilized for trials. And yet this commission report has emerged as a benchmark within and outside of Guatemala.

It is the first commission in the hemisphere to conclude that genocide has occurred during the period under its investigation. This has never happened before in Latin America. And by finding for genocide, it has opened up the possibility for trials.

GROSS: You spent about 10 years interviewing military men in Guatemala trying to understand the mindset behind state sponsored violence. Why has that been so important for you to understand? Why do you think it's important for us to understand that?

SCHIRMER: My sense is that unless we understand why violence occurs and how it becomes justified, how people come to explain what they have done to themselves and to others in their group into the world; that we will not be any closer. And we can document abuses and we can document massive campaigns which are extraordinarily important to do, but we also need to understand why it happens.

How it becomes justified. What are the ideologies which allow us to believe that what we're doing is correct and not only correct, but supremely necessary in order to maintain a vision of order and stability. Unless we understand that, we're not any closer, I believe, in trying to keep such violence from reoccurring in the world.

GROSS: Well, I want to thank you very much for talking with us.

SCHIRMER: It's been my pleasure.

GROSS: Jennifer Schirmer teaches at Harvard and is the author of "The Guatemalan Military Project."

President Clinton is scheduled to visit Guatemala next week as part of a Central American trip. The White House says he will most likely discuss the findings of the truth commission's report with Guatemala's leaders.

I'm Terry Gross.

This is a rush transcript. This copy may not
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TO PURCHASE AN AUDIOTAPE OF THIS PIECE, PLEASE CALL 877-21FRESH
Dateline: Terry Gross, Washington, DC
Guest: Jennifer Schirmer
High: Political anthropologist Jennifer Schirmer. Beginning in 1986, she interviewed Guatemalan military officials of all different levels getting them to talk about their participation in atrocities. Her new book, based on that research, is "The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy."
Spec: Latin America; Violence; War; World Affairs; Death; Murders; Human Rights; Jennifer Schirmer

Please note, this is not the final feed of record
Copy: Content and programming copyright 1999 WHYY, Inc. All rights reserved. Transcribed by FDCH, Inc. under license from WHYY, Inc. Formatting copyright 1999 FDCH, Inc. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to WHYY, Inc. This transcript may not be reproduced in whole or in part without prior written permission.
End-Story: Jennifer Schirmer
Transcripts are created on a rush deadline, and accuracy and availability may vary. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Please be aware that the authoritative record of Fresh Air interviews and reviews are the audio recordings of each segment.